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Homogeneous mixing, where all instances of contacts between 
any two members of the population are equally likely, is a common 
assumption in modeling biodefense policies against smallpox. Such a 
mixing pattern is rather unlikely to represent population interaction in 
a modern urban setting, which typically is separated into households 
on one hand, and into daily meeting sites such as schools and offices, 
on the other hand. In this paper, we develop a dynamic two-level 
social interaction model where individuals move back and forth 
between home and daily meeting sites, possibly passing through a 
general meeting site such as a mass transit system or other crowded 
areas. Based on this difference-equations model, we evaluate the effect 
of situational awareness and response measures, such as vaccination, 





Responding to a bioterror attack of smallpox has become a major concern to 
governments, local public officials, and health authorities. This concern has been 
reflected in studies that model and evaluate possible response policies against 
smallpox [1]-[8]. A common assumption in these models (e.g., [1]-[5]) is 
homogeneous mixing, where all instances of contacts between any two members of 
the population are equally likely. In other words, interactions in the population are 
uniformly random. The main implication of this assumption is that interaction 
probabilities among individuals depend only on the relative size of the susceptible and 
infectious populations—a feature that simplifies the analysis. 
 
Such a mixing pattern is quite unlikely to represent actual interactions in an urban 
setting where the population is typically divided into interconnecting subsets. 
Halloran et al. [6] present a heterogeneous mixing simulation model for smallpox 
where ad hoc social structure is considered. The model is applied to a small 
population of 2,000 people. An excellent review of recent smallpox models is by 
Furgeson et al [7]. A number of studies examine nonhomogeneous mixing in other 
epidemic settings. Some ad hoc social mixing patterns are studied in [9] and [10].  
Ball and Lyne [11] consider a population partitioned into households, with local 
mixing within households and global mixing throughout the population, and develop a 
vaccination optimization model. The effects of a similar social structure are studied by 
Koopman et al [12]. Other heterogeneous mixing models have been studied by Kaplan 
with respect to the AIDS epidemic [13] [14]. 
 
The concept of small world networks [15] [16] is utilized by several researchers to 
model nonhomogeneous transmission in a population [17]-[19]. Eubank et al. [18] 
develop a detailed large-scale urban traffic simulation, and find that interactions 
among people form a strongly connected small-world-like graph. They examine 
several response policies and conclude that outbreaks can be contained by a 
combination of targeted vaccination and early detection. 
 
In this paper we develop a two-level social interaction model that consists of 
households and other daily meeting sites such as schools, offices, and mass transit 
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systems. This SIR-based difference-equations model captures dynamic features of 
daily contacts among individuals in a major urban area. We apply this model to a 
large urban area (9 million people) and evaluate the effect of situational awareness 
(early detection and response) and several response measures, such as mass 
vaccination, quarantine, closure, mass-transit shutdown, and voluntary self-quarantine 
on the spread of the epidemic and on the total number of casualties. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the social structure 
that forms the base for our model and analysis. Section 3 outlines the stages of the 
epidemic and discusses possible response actions. The two-level model is described in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we report the results of the analysis that is based on our 
model. Discussion and concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. A detailed 
description of the difference-equation model is given in the Appendix. 
 
2. The Social Structure 
We assume that during each time period (i.e., a day) a person interacts with other 
persons mainly in two places: in the household (HH) and in the daily meeting site 
(DMS), such as school or workplace. There may also be incidental contacts in public 
places such as mass transit systems, restaurants, or theaters. We consider these 
contacts as occurring in a general meeting site (GMS). During the course of a day, a 
person is in (close) contact people with a relatively small number of individuals in the 
HH, then she meets colleagues, fellow students, or coworkers in the DMS, and finally 










Figure 1: Interaction Pattern in a Two-Level Social Structure 
 
Thus, we assume that the population is divided into m HHs of size h each. There are  
k DMSs, k > h, and one GMS. On each day, members of a HH visit certain DMSs. We 
assume a worst-case scenario, from the epidemic spread point of view, where the 
DMSs are chosen randomly and independently by HH members each day. We also 
assume that effectively no two members of a certain HH visit the same DMS, e.g., a 
mother does not visit the school (at least not for a significant length of time) and her 
child does not visit her workplace. Thus, members of the same HH do not interact in a 
DMS. They interact in the HH and possibly in the GMS (e.g., if both use the mass 
transit system on a certain day). Within each subset of population—HH, DMS, and 
GMS—we assume homogeneous mixing. However, the contact rates (and hence the 
transmission rates of the disease) are different in the three environments; the 
transmission rate is highest in a HH and lowest in the GMS. 
 
The spread of the epidemic is observed at discrete time periods (days). Each time 
period is divided into two parts: the HH subperiod and the DMS subperiod. During 
the HH subperiod individuals stay in their respective HHs (homes), while during the 
DMS subperiod they are present in their respective DMSs (workplace, school, etc.). 
Some individuals may visit also the GMS in-between the two periods. The state of the 
epidemic in the HHs and DMSs is monitored at four points during a time period: at 
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the beginning and end of the HH subperiod, and at the beginning and end of the  
DMS subperiod. At the beginning of the HH subperiod, we observe the state of the 
members of a HH after they return from the DMSs and possibly GMS, and at the end 
of that period, we observe the transitions that have occurred in the HH during the  
HH subperiod. Similar observations apply to the DMS subperiod. 
 
3. The Epidemic and Possible Response Actions 
The stages of the epidemic are S, A, B, I, and Q for susceptible, infected and 
immunable (vaccine sensitive), infected and nonimmunable, infectious and 
quarantined. A HH is said to be infected if at least one member in the HH is infected, 
but no one is infectious (symptomatic). An infected HH may be immunable (denoted 
type A) if all of its infected members are immunable. Otherwise, it is not-immunable 
(type B).  Clearly, some members in a nonimmunable infected HH (type B) may be 
susceptible (at stage S) or infected and immunable (stage A). A HH is said to be 
infectious (type I) if at least one member in the HH is or has been infectious, and it is 
said to be quarantined (type Q) if it has been put in quarantine. Otherwise, a HH is 
said to be susceptible (type S). We assume that vaccination and quarantine are applied 
to HHs and not to individuals. We assume perfect vaccination efficacy, therefore, 
susceptible or infected-immunable HHs that are vaccinated are removed from further 
consideration. Once an infectious individual is detected, his entire HH is quarantined. 
If that HH has not been previously vaccinated, all asymptomatic members are 
vaccinated upon entering the quarantine. Only infectious HHs are quarantined. 
 
HHs of types B and I that are vaccinated are labeled BV and IV, respectively. Also, 
QV denotes a quarantined HH that has been previously vaccinated. Figure 2 presents 
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Figure 2: The Stages of the Epidemic 
 
Since we assume perfect vaccination efficacy, vaccinated HHs of type S and A are 
immune and removed. Households of types B and I may be vaccinated, but only the 
individuals at stages S and A in those HHs become immune. The rest (those at stages 
B and I) are unaffected by the vaccination. 
 
Without loss of generality we assume that transitions in the stage of a HH, including 
vaccination and quarantining, occur during the HH period. A DMS may be either 
infectious, if at least one member is infectious, or noninfectious. Infectious DMSs may 
generate new infected individuals. 
 
We consider the following response actions: 
 
• Mass vaccination; 
• Quarantine; 
• Shutdown of GMSs (e.g., shutdown of a mass transit system); 
• Closure of DMSs (e.g., closing up schools); and 
• Encouraging people to stay home. 
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The response actions are initiated after a certain number of individuals become 
infectious (Stage I). We assume that the vaccination and the DMS closure processes 
start after there are  infectious individuals. This number is the vaccination/DMS 
closure threshold. The smaller the value of 
1∆
1∆ , the better the situational awareness 
capabilities of the system. The shutdown of the GMS is also triggered by the number 
of infectious individuals in the population. The GMS is shut down if this number 
exceeds . While the GMS is shut down instantaneously following a decision to that 
effect, the process of closing up the DMSs is gradual and takes time. Once the DMS 




We assume that a fraction γ  of the population passes through the GMS, and a 
proportion β  of the (not yet isolated) infectious individuals complies with requests of 
the authorities and voluntarily stay at home. Note that in terms of the epidemic spread, 
the latter assumption represents a worst-case scenario; self-imposed quarantine does 
not apply to susceptible individuals—only to infectious ones. Finally, infectious HHs 
are isolated (removed) at a rate ρ . 
 
4. The Model 
The model comprises a set of difference-equations shown in the Appendix. It is 
essentially a deterministic model, but with embedded probabilities that capture the 
transition intensities between stages. The spread of the disease is observed at  
two levels: high level, at which we observe the transitions between sets (HHs and 
DMSs), and low level, at which we observe the transitions within sets. At any time 
period t, we record the number of sets of a certain type (e.g., S, A, etc.) at the high 
level, and the average profile (composition) of disease stages within a set, at the low 
level. For example, B(t) is the number of HHs of type B, and ( ), ( ), ( )B B Bs t a t b t  are 
the average numbers of individuals in such HHs that are at stages S, A, and B, 
respectively. The difference equations, shown in the Appendix, describe the 
transitions between sets of stages at the high level, and the changes in the average 
profiles within sets, at the low level. Recall that at each time period (day) the 
epidemic is observed four times: at the beginning and end of the HH subperiod, and 
the beginning and end of the DMS subperiod. 
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To simplify notation, we use capitals to denote both the type of a set and the number 
of sets of that type. For example, I(t) denotes an infectious HH and the number of 
such HHs in the population. This double meaning should cause no confusion. 
Specifically, the symbol ( )jX t  denotes the number of sets (HHs or DMSs) of type X 
at time t. The index j is 0,1 where j = 0 indicates a beginning of a subperiod (HH or 
DMS), and j = 1 indicates the end of it. To summarize, X gets the following values:  
 
S –  Number of susceptible HHs. 
A – Number of infective-immunable HHs. 
B – Number of infective nonimmunable HHs. 
BV – Number of infective nonimmunable HHs that have been vaccinated  
(Only individuals at stage B remain infective, the rest—S and A individuals—
are vaccinated and removed). 
I – Number of infectious HHs that have not been vaccinated yet. I0 are newly 
infected HHs. 
IV – Number of infectious HHs that have been vaccinated. VI0 are newly  
infected HHs. 
Q – Number of isolated HHs. 
QV – Number of isolated, previously vaccinated, HHs. 
D – Number of open DMSs. 
ID – Number of open infectious DMSs. 
 
The notation at the low level is of the form , where y indicates the stage of the 




0 ( )As t – Average number of susceptible individuals, at the beginning of the t-th HH 
period, in an infective-immunable HH that has not been vaccinated yet. 
1 ( )IVs t – Average number of susceptible individuals, at the end of the t-th HH period, 
in an infectious HH that has been vaccinated. 
0 ( )Aa t – Average number of immunable infective individuals, at the beginning of the 
t-th HH period, in an infective HH that has not been vaccinated yet. 
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1 ( )BVb t – Average number of nonimmunable infective individuals, at the end of the  
t-th HH period, in an infective nonimmunable HH that has been vaccinated. 
1( )Ii t – Average number of infectious individuals, at the end of the t-th HH period, 
in an infectious HH that has not been vaccinated yet. 
0 ( )IDs t – Average number of susceptible individuals in an infectious DMS at the 
beginning of the DMS period. 
 
In addition, we denote 
 
( )NewXa t – Average number of newly infected individuals in an infectious DMS, who 
belong to a HH of type X, X=S, A, B, BV, I, IV.  is the average 
total number of newly infected individuals in an infectious DMS. 
( )NewIDa t
 
Note that while the number of individuals in a HH remains constant throughout the 
epidemic, the average number of individuals in a DMS changes over time as HHs are 
isolated and infectious persons stay home. 
 
The parameters of the model are: 
 
M  – Number of HHs. 
K  – Number of DMSs. 
h  – Size of a HH. 
V  – Vaccination capacity (# of HHs/day). 
V  – Vaccination rate (percentage of population vaccinated). 
p  – Transition rate between stages A and B. 
q  – Transition rate between stages B and I. 
Hα   – Infection rate in a HH. 
Dα   – Infection rate in a DMS. 
Gα   – Infection rate in the GMS. 
γ   – Fraction of individuals that visit the GMS during a time-period. 
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β   – Fraction of infectious people in a (not yet isolated) infectious HH that stay 
home because of personal choice (regardless if their corresponding DMSs are 
closed or open). 
ρ   – Isolation rate of infectious HHs. 
θ   – Recovery rate from isolation. 
δ   – Closure rate of (infectious) DMSs. 
1∆  – Vaccination/DMS closure threshold. 
2∆  – GMS shutdown threshold. 
 
To demonstrate the basic idea of the model we present next a sample of three  
typical equations: 
 
1. High level transition during the HH subperiod: 
 
 . (1) 
0 0( ) ( )1 0 0( ) [ ( )(1 ) ( )(1 (1 ) )] {1 ( ),0}B Ab t a tB t B t q A t p Max v t= − + − − −
 
Equation (1) gives the number of HHs of type B (not yet vaccinated) at the end of the 
HH subperiod. 
 
2. Low level transition:  
 
 0 0( ) ( )1 0 0 0 01
1( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 (1 ) {1 ( ),0}
( )
B Ab t a t
B B As t s t B t q s t A t p Max v tB t
 = − + − −  − . (2) 
 
Equation (2) gives the average number of susceptible individuals in HHs of type B. 
 
3. Low level in a DMS. 
 
 . (3) 0 0( )NewID D ID IDa t s iα=
 
Equation (3) gives the average number of newly infected in an infectious DMS. 
 
The complete set of equations is presented in the Appendix. 
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5. Analysis 
We consider two base cases. In Base Case 1, we assume that the response policy is 
based only on mass vaccination and quarantine of infectious HHs. Other response 
measures such as DMSs closure, GMS shutdown, and compliance with self-imposed 
quarantine are not implemented. Base case 2 is the complement of Base Case 1. There 
is no mass vaccination, only quarantine (and vaccination) of infectious (type I) HHs 
that are detected. However, DMSs are gradually closed up, the GMS is shut down 
after a while, and a certain proportion of infectious individuals (not yet quarantined) 
stay home. In both cases, we assume that the initial attack resulted in ten casualties 
(infected people) in each one of five DMSs plus ten infected in the GMS. Table 1 
presents the parameters that are fixed for both base cases and in the subsequent 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
Parameter Description Value 
M Number of HHs 3,000,000 
h Average size of a HH 3 
k Number of DMSs 10000 
Hα  Infection rate in a HH 0.5 
Dα  Infection rate in a DMS 0.001 
Gα  Infection rate in the GMS 0.000001 
p  Disease stage A rate 0.3 
q  Disease stage B rate 0.12 ρ  Disease stage I rate 
(Isolation rate of infectious HHs) 
0.3 
θ  Disease stage Q rate 
(Recovery rate) 
0.083 
γ  Proportion of population that passes through the GMS 0.5 
Table 1: Values of Fixed Parameters 
 
Table 2 presents the values of the remaining parameters in the two base cases. 
 
Parameter Description Base Case 1 Base Case 2
δ  Closure rate of DMSs 0 .03 
β  Fraction of infectious individuals that stay home 0 .5 
1∆  Vaccination/DMS Closure Threshold 20 20 
2∆  GMS Shutdown Threshold No Closure 250 
V Vaccination Capacity (HHs/Day) 157,000 0 
Table 2: Values of Variable Parameters 
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Based on these parameters, Base Case 1 (vaccination, no public restrictions) results in 
2,068 infectious individuals in addition to the casualties of the initial attack, while 
Base Case 2 (no vaccination, public restrictions) results in 2,070 additional casualties. 
Evidently, the total numbers of casualties are essentially equal. That is, preventive 
measures that include closure of DMSs at a rate of 3% per day, shutting down the 
GMS when there are 250 infectious cases, and 50% infectious “stay-home” 
compliance is equivalent to the mass vaccination of 157,000 HHs per day with no 
other social movement-control measures. However, the way the epidemic evolves 























Figure 3: Daily Numbers of Newly Infectious 
 


























Figure 4: Daily Numbers of People in Quarantine 
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As shown in Figure 3, the epidemic in Base Case 1 is shorter, but with a higher daily 
peak than Base Case 2. Figure 4 shows the ramification of this effect, namely, higher 
demand in Base Case 1 for peak quarantine capacity than in Base Case 2. 
 
Next, we investigate the sensitivity of these base cases to changes in the values of the 
operational parameters. The measure of effectiveness is the number of casualties, 
which are the total number of infectious individuals. Figure 5 shows the impact of 
situational awareness and responsiveness of the public-health system. The delay in the 
vaccination process, which is represented by the number of infectious individuals that 
trigger the initiation of the process, affects the number of casualties. If the  
public-health system has excellent situational awareness and is quick to respond, then 
the minimum possible number of casualties is about 850. If, because of poor 
situational awareness and/or slow response, there are, say, 80 infectious people in the 
population before vaccination starts, then the number of casualties is higher in an 
order of magnitude. 
 
Figures 6-8 depict the consequences of Base Case 1 (with V = 150,000 HHs/day) 
when additional social movement-control measures are imposed. Figure 6 investigates 
the effect of DMS closure on the number of casualties. With no DMS closure, the 
number of casualties is close to 2,400. A closure process at a rate of 10% a day 
decreases the number of casualties to about 500. The effect of the delay in shutting 
down the GMS is shown in Figure 7. If, theoretically, the GMS (e.g., mass transit 
system) is shut down immediately following the attack, then there are only  
282 casualties. If it is shut down when there are already 500 infectious individuals, 






























































Figure 7: The Effect of GMS Shutdown Threshold – Base Case 1 
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The effect of voluntary self-quarantine is demonstrated in Figure 8. Note that if 60% 
of the infectious individuals stay home, then the number of casualties is reduced by 
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Figure 8: The Effect of Self-Quarantine – Base Case 1 
 
Let us consider now Base Case 2 and investigate the effect of adding to the social 
movement-control measures mass vaccination. Figures 9-12 depict the effect of 
vaccination capacity, with respect to DMSs’ closure rate (δ ), vaccination/DMS 
closure threshold ( ), GMS shutdown threshold (1∆ 2∆ ), and self-quarantine 
compliance rate ( β ), respectively. Each chart represents the base case and two 




















































































































































Figure 12: Effect of Self-quarantine 
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Figures 9-12 reveal a consistent picture, namely, that the impact of situational 
awareness and social movement-control measures can be significant, but it decreases 
as the vaccination capacity increases. One small exception is the vaccination/closure 
threshold . Even if the vaccination capacity is 240,000 HHs/day, the number of 
casualties in the worse case scenario 
1∆
1 50∆ =  is almost 3.5 times higher than in the 
case where  1 5.∆ =
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that (mass) vaccination-free policies, where the response 
relies entirely on social movement-control measures, may be compatible to a policy 
that is based on mass vaccination. Moreover, while the latter policy eradicates the 
epidemic faster than the former, the required peak quarantine capacity is significantly 
higher. Figures 5-8 show what happens if a mass vaccination policy is augmented 
with social movement-control measures and situational awareness is considered. The 
effects are quite significant. For example, if one-third of the infectious population 
withdraws to their home, the number of casualties is reduced by 55% compared with 
no self-quarantine. A similar effect is recorded when the GMS is shutdown early in 
the epidemic. If the trigger for a shutdown is 250 infectious people in the population, 
then the number of casualties is 1,594. If the trigger is 50 people, then the result is 
only 742 casualties. 
 
These results indicate that a hybrid policy that combines moderate rate of  
mass-vaccination with moderate application of social movement-control measures 
may be an efficient response policy. Table 3 presents the parameters of a third  
base-case, which is a combination of the two approaches: vaccination and social 
movement-control. 
 
Parameter Description Base Case 3 
δ  Closure rate of DMSs .01 
β  Fraction of infectious individuals that stay home .3 
1∆  Vaccination/DMS Closure Threshold 10 
2∆  GMS Shutdown Threshold 100 
V Vaccination Capacity (HHs/Day) 75,000 
Table 3: Base Case 3 
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The total number of casualties in Base Case 3 is 1,358—about 35% less casualties 
than in Base Cases 1 and 2. Similar to Figure 3, Figure 13 compares the three base 
























Figure 13: Daily Numbers of Newly Infectious – Base Cases 1, 2, and 3 
 
While the peak of the epidemic is about the same as in Base Case 2 (47 casualties in  
Base Case 2, 43 casualties in Base Case 3), the epidemic is eradicated much faster:  
76 days compared with 113 days. 
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Appendix: Difference-Equations Model 
 
A. HH Subperiod 
Let 
 0 0 0
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
V tv t
S t A t I t
= + +  (4) 
 




  (5) 1 0( ) ( ) {1 ( ),0}S t S t Max v t= −
  (6) 
0 ( )1 0( ) ( )(1 ) {1 ( ),0}Aa tA t A t p Max v t= − −
  (7) 
0 0( ) ( )1 0 0( ) [ ( )(1 ) ( )(1 (1 ) )] {1 ( ),0}B Ab t a tB t B t q A t p Max v t= − + − − −
 
 
0 0 0( ) ( ) ( )1 0 0 0( ) ( )(1 ) [ ( )(1 ) ( )(1 (1 ) )] { ( ),1}BV B Ab t b t a tBV t BV t q B t q A t p Min v t= − + − + − −  (8) 
  (9) 
0 ( )1 0
0( ) ( )[1 (1 ) ] {1 ( ),0}B
b tI t B t q Max v t= − − −
 
0 0( ) ( )1 0 0
0 ( ) [1 (1 ) ] ( )[1 (1 ) ] {1, ( )}BV B
b t b tIV t BV q B t q Min v t= − − + − −  (10) 
 1 0( ) ( ) {1 ( ),0}(1 )I t I t Max v t ρ= − −  (11) 
 
 1 0 0( ) ( ( ) ( ) {1, ( )})(1 )IV t IV t I t Min v t ρ= + −  (12) 
 0( ) ( ) ( 1)Q t I t Q tρ= + −  (13) 




Susceptible HH (S) 
 
1 0( ) ( )S Ss t s t h= =  (15)  
 . (16) 1 1 1 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S S S S S Sa t b t i t a t b t i t= = = = = =
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Infective Immunable HH (A) 
 
 1 0( ) ( )A As t s t=  (17) 
  (18) 1 0( ) ( )A Aa t a t=
 1 0( ) ( ) 0A Ab t b t= =  (19) 
 1 0( ) ( ) 0A Ai t i t= = . (20) 
 
Infective Not-immunable HH (B) 
 
 0 0( ) ( )1 0 0 0 01
1( ) ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 (1 ) {1 ( ),0}
( )
B Ab t a t
B B As t s t B t q s t A t p Max v tB t









1( ) ( )(1 ) ( )(1 )
( )









a t a t p B t q
B t
pa t A t p Max v t
p
= − − +











1( ) ( ( ) ) ( )(1 )
( )









b t b t a p B t q
B t
pa t A t p Max v t
p
= + − +
− − −− − 
 (23) 
 1 0( ) ( ) 0B Bi t i t= = . (24) 
 
Vaccinated Infective Not-immunable HH (BV) 
  






( )1 0 0
1
( )0 0 0
( )0 0
( )
1( ) ( ) ( )(1 )
( )
( ( ) ) ( )(1 )












b t b t BV t q
BV t
b t a p B t q
pa t A t p Min v t
p
= − +
 + − +
− − − −   
. (26) 
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Newly Infectious HH (I0) 
 
  (27) 
0
1 0( ) ( )I Bs t s t=
 
0




( ) ( ) 1 ( )
1 (1 ) B
I B Bb t
qb t b t a t p
q





( ) ( )
1 (1 ) B
I B b t
qi t b t
q
= − − . (30) 
Vaccinated Newly Infectious HH (IV0) 
 
  (31) 
0 0 0 0












1( ) ( ) 1 ( )(1 (1 ) )
( ) 1 (1 )







IV BV b t
b t
B b t
qb t b t BV t q
IV t q
qb t B t q Min v t
q
  = − − −   − −  
  + − − −   − −   
 (32) 
 { }01 0 0 0 0101( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { ( ),1}( )IV BV Bi t qb t BV t qb t B t Min v tIV t= + . (33) 
Infectious HH (I) 
 
  (34) 1 0 0(1 )I I H Is s iα= −
  (35) 1 0( ) ( )(1 )I I Ha t a t p s iα= − + 0 0I I
  (36) 1 0 0( ) ( )(1 ) ( )I I Ib t b t q a t p= − +
 . (37) 1 0 0( ) ( ) ( )I I Ii t i t b t q= +
 
Vaccinated Infectious HH (IV) 
 
 1 0 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0IV IV IV IVs t s t a t a t= = = =  (38) 
 1 0( ) ( )(1 )IV IVb t b t q= −  (39) 
 . (40) 1 0 0( ) ( ) ( )IV IV IVi t i t b t= + q
 20
Isolated Not Previously Vaccinated HH (Q) 
(Assumption: Individuals not previously vaccinated are vaccinated immediately upon 
arrival at the quarantine). 
 
 1 0 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0Q Q Q Qs t s t a t a t= = = =  (41) 
 ( ){ ( ) }0 01( ) 1 ( 1) ( 1) 1 ( ) ( )( )Q Q Ib t q b t Q t q b t I tQ t ρ= − − − + −  (42) 
 { }0 0 01( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( ( ) ( )) ( )( )Q Q Q I Ii t i t qb t Q t qb t i t I tQ t ρ= − + − − + + . (43) 
 
Isolated Previously Vaccinated HH (QV) 
 
1 0 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0QV QV QV QVs t s t a t a t= = = =  (44)  
 ( ){ ( ) }0 01( ) ( 1) 1 ( 1) ( ) 1 ( )( )QV QV IVb t b t q QV t b t q IV tQV t ρ= − − − + −  (45) 
 { }0 0 01( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( ( ) ( )) ( )( )QV QV QV IV IVi t i t qb t QV t qb t i t IV tQV t ρ= − + − − + + . (46) 
 
At the end of the HH-cycle, the total number of susceptibles and immunable  
infected are: 
 
  (47) 
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Total A B I Is t S t h A t s t B t s t I t s t I t s t= + + + +
 . (48) 
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1





And the total number of infectious individuals is: 
 
 . (49) 
0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ))Total I I IV IVi t I t i t I t i t IV t i t IV t i t= + + +
 
The number of commuting infectious individuals from an infectious HH is 
 
 . (50) 1 ( ) (1 ) ( )Iic t i tβ= −
0
1 1 1( ), ( ) and ( )I IV IVic t ic t ic t are defined similarly. 
 
The total commuting infectious individuals is: 
 
0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0( ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )Total I I IV IVic t I t ic t I t ic t IV t ic t IV t ic t= + + + . (51)  
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( ) ( )( )( ) 1 111 ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1
I t IV tIV tI t
I IIVI ic t ic tic tic tID t D t
K K K K
          = − − − − −                 
V (53) 
 
Explanation: Suppose D(t) = uK. Only a proportion u of the DMSs are open and therefore only a 
proportion u of the population leaves home. Since each member of a HH goes to a different DMS, this 




We assume that the contacts in the GMS occur between the HH cycle and the  
DMS cycle. 
 
 1( )( ) ( )GMS Total





  (55) 1( ) ( )GMS Totals t sγ=
 
The number of newly infected individuals at the GMS is: 
 
 . (56) ( )NewGMS G GMS GMSa t s iα=
 
Let 
denote the number of newly infected at the GMS that belong to S, A, B, and I HH, 
respectively. Since the probability that a newly infective belongs to a certain type of a 
HH is proportional to the number of susceptibles in such a HH, we have: 










S t ha t a t
s t









A t s ta t a t
s t









B t s ta t a t
s t
=  (59) 
 0
1 1 1 1
0
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





II t s t I t s ta t a t
s t
+= . (60) 
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ic tD ti t
K ID t
=  (61) 
 
1




s t as t
K
−= t . (62) 
 
Since response actions and transitions between disease stages are assumed to take 
place during the HHs cycle, we do not need to track either the noninfectious open 
DMSs or the individuals who are at the latent stages (immunable and nonimmunable) 
of the disease. 
 
C. DMS Cycle 
 
Since transitions between disease stages are assumed to take place only in the HHs, 
the DMSs do not change their status during this cycle. The only parameter of interest 




Infectious Open DMS (ID) 
 
The number of newly infected individuals in an open DMS is: 
 
 . (63) 0 0( )NewID D ID IDa t s iα=
 
A newly infected individual may belong to a susceptible HH (S), an infective HH (A), 




denote the number of newly infectives that belong to S, A, and I HH, respectively. 
Since the probability that a newly infective belongs to a certain type of HH is 
proportional to the number of susceptibles in such a HH, we have: 










S t ha t a t
s t









B t s ta t a t
s t









B t s ta t a t
s t
=  (66) 
 0
1 1 1 1
0
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )





II t s t I t s ta t a t
s t
+= . (67) 
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( 1) ( 1)( ) ( 1) 1 1
( 1) ( 1)
ID tNew New
DS GSa t a tS t S t
S t S t
−  −= − − −    − −   1
−   (68) 
  (69) 0 1 1 0( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( )A t A t S t S t= − + − −
 0 1( ) ( 1)B t B t= −  (70) 
 
 0 1( ) ( 1)BV t BV t= −  (71) 
 
 0 1 10( ) ( 1) ( 1)I t I t I t= − + −  (72) 




Susceptible HH (S) 
 
 0 ( )Ss t h=  (74) 
 0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ) 0S S Sa t b t i t= = = . (75) 
 






1( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( ( 1) ( 1))
( )





s t A t s t ID t a t a t
A t
a t a t S t S t h
= − − − − − +






1( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)( ( 1) ( 1))
( )





a t A t a t ID t a t a t
A t
a t a t
= − − + − − +
+ − + − 
DS −
 (77) 
 0 ( ) 0Ab t =  (78) 
 
 0 ( ) 0Ai t = . (79) 
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Infective Not-immunable HH (B) 
 
 0 1 10
1( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( )
New New
B B DB GBs t B t s t ID t a t a tB t
 = − − − − − − −  (80) 
 0 1 10
1( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
( )
New New
B B DB GBa t B t a t ID t a t a tB t
 = − − + − − + −   (81) 
 0 1( ) ( 1)B Bb t b t= −  (82) 
 0 ( ) 0Bi t = . (83) 
 
Infectious HH (I) 
 
 0
0 1 1 1 1
00




I I I DI
New
GI
s t I t s t I t s t ID t a t
I t
a t




0 1 1 1 1
00







a t I t a t I t a t ID t a t
I t
a t





1 1 1 1
00
0





I t b t I t b t
b t
I t
I− − + − −=  (86) 
 
 0
1 1 1 1
00
0





I t i t I t i t
i t
I t
I− − + − −= . (87) 
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